NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2008 by Christopher Pissarides
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of 
Economic Research
Volume Title: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2008 
Volume Author/Editor: Jeffrey Frankel and Christopher Pissarides, organizers




Conference Date: June 20-21, 2008
Publication Date: April 2009
Chapter Title: Comment on "Regional difference-in-differences in France using 
the German annexation of Alsace-Moselle in 1870-1918"
Chapter Author: Christopher Pissarides
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8249
Chapter pages in book: (p. 310 - 314)Comment
Christopher A. Pissarides, London School of Economics
Much effort in modern labor economics is devoted to finding “natural
experiments,” which can be peculiarities in legislation that give rise to
different treatments of otherwise similar subjects. When the interest is
labor market policy, in Europe usually the unit of analysis is the nation.
Countries are small and policies are national, but there are still signifi-
cant policy differences across countries. Cross‐country analyses, usually
with panels of data going back to the 1970s, have shed important light
on the impact of labor market policies on the economy. But they have
been plaguedbythe factthat despitethe convergencethat istakingplace
in the context of the European Union, there are still large differences in
manyotherdimensionsacrosstheunion.Identifyingtheimpactofpolicy
from that of other national characteristics has been difficult.
Chemin and Wasmer’s paper identifies a peculiarity in the coverage
of legislation in France across its regions that enables a more reliable
analysis of the impact of policy, on the assumption that other regional
differences within France are less important than, say, differences be-
tween France and Germany. An area of France, Alsace‐Moselle, was un-
der German jurisdiction between 1870 and 1918, and many laws that
were brought in at that time are still in force. Subsequent changes in
French legislation sometimes applied differently in Alsace‐Moselle than
i nt h er e s to fF r a n c e ,a n ds oo n ec a nd oa“difference‐in‐difference”
comparison of the response to the legislation change in Alsace‐Moselle
with the response in the rest of France. Given that the reason that policy
coverage is different in Alsace‐Moselle than in the rest of France is exog-
enous, this would be a valid comparison.
Of course, a simple comparison without any correction requires that
Alsace‐Moselle be identical in all other respects to the rest of France.
This, however, is not likely to be the case. For example, they are the
only regions in France that share a border with Germany, and this alone
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their exposure to German shocks. A thorough study of the impact of the
differences in the laws of Alsace‐M o s e l l ea n dt h er e s to fF r a n c ew i l l
need to control for the other differences between the two regions and
the rest of the country. The authors do correct for permanent differences
between the regions and the rest of France and find some differences in
the policy impacts that have interesting implications for more general
policy impacts.
The first difference in policy coverage is income support. Alsace‐
Moselle had in operation a system of support for low incomes since
its German days (presumably associated with the Bismarck welfare
support programs), but the rest of France introduced it only in 1989.
The support amounts to bringing up low incomes to some level below
the minimum wage, so it applies to unemployed workers. The question
is whether this support discourages job search and increases unemploy-
ment durations.
The authors compare the responses of long‐term unemployment to
this change in 1989 in Alsace‐Moselle and the rest of France. They find
a larger rise in long‐term unemployment in the rest of France than in
Alsace‐Moselle across the policy change, and they attribute the differ-
ence to the impact of policy. They conclude that the disincentive effects
of the policy are strong.
There is a large amount of evidence that unemployment compensa-
tion reduces search incentives and increases unemployment. Reason-
able panel estimates with cross‐country data put the impact at about
1.1 percentage points of unemployment for a 10‐percentage‐point dif-
ference in unemployment compensation. However, there is virtually no
evidence about income support programs associated with low income.
Is this policy change equivalent—in terms of coverage, administration,
and so forth—to unemployment compensation or is there something
more to it? A comparison with what we know about the impact of un-
employment compensation would have been useful. The main impact
studied in the paper is the one that obtains after unemployment com-
pensation is exhausted. This is a valid restriction only if at lower dura-
tions unemployment compensation brings incomes above the level
guaranteed by the new policy, a point not investigated in the paper.
A second welfare policy reform in France not affecting Alsace‐Moselle
was the introduction in 1978 of more generous sick leave for employees
with more than 3 years' tenure. Alsace‐Moselle already had a more gen-
eroussick leave systemin operation for all employees, so the new pol-
icy did not change coverage in it. Difference‐in‐difference comparisons
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show a substantial increase in absenteeism among French workers with
more than 3 years’ tenure but no change for those with lower tenures.
Althoughthecomputedcoefficientsarenotusedinthepapertocalculate
days lost by the introduction of the new policy, they seem rather high.
They are of about the same order of magnitude as the impact of the first
policy change on the incidence of long‐term unemployment.
Another impact of the sick leave policy change is on labor turnover.
Again using the same methodology, the authors find that the policy re-
duced labor turnover in the rest of France when compared with Alsace‐
Moselle. The entitlement to more generous sick leave kicked in after
3 years’ tenure in the same job, so a quitting employee loses all her ac-
cumulated entitlement. Making the entitlement transferable would alle-
viate this problem, which could have other negative consequences for
the performance of the labor market.
Finally, the authors explore the implications of a third “anomaly” in
the comparison between Alsace‐Moselle and the rest of France. Tradi-
tionally, Alsace‐Moselle had two extra days of holiday a year. As 2 days
amount to 16 hours of work, following the introduction of the shorter
workweek in France in 2000, employers in Alsace‐Moselle could satisfy
the law by reducing annual hours by 16 hours less than employers in the
rest of France. This privilege, however, lasted only for 2 years, as the
courts ruled otherwise in 2002. The authors investigate the impact of
the smaller reduction in annual hours in Alsace‐Moselle on unemploy-
ment for these 2 years by comparing unemployment before and after
the policy change in 2000 in the two regions.
Heretheauthorsfindaratherlargeimpactofthereformbutonethatis
not plausible. They find that unemployment in Alsace‐Moselle increased
by more than in the rest of France, and if this is interpreted as the impact
of the reduction in hours of work, it leads to the conclusion that the re-
ductioninhoursreducedunemploymentbyalargeamount.Theauthors
reject this interpretation and attribute the bigger “recession” in Alsace‐
Moselle in 2000–2002 to a deeper recession in Germany than in France
affectingtheregion.Thispartoftheresearch,however,isnotconvincing,
and the impact of the reduction in hours of work on unemployment re-
mains an open question.
It seems to me that the difference in the reduction of hours—about
16 hours per year for 2 years—is too small to have an impact on em-
ployment in a country that has strict employment protection legislation.
Especially during a recession, employers are likely to wait before chang-
ing employment when the law changes the maximum hours of work.
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rest of France, in both magnitude and duration, one should not expect
to see an immediate impact on employment that could be picked up in
a difference‐in‐difference regression. This concurs with the authors’ pre-
ferred interpretation, that the policy change had no impact on unemploy-
ment,butitisnotcompellingtogeneralizefromthefailuretopickupany
effect here to the conclusion that the change in hours of work had no im-
pactnationwide.Theexperimenthereseemstobetoosmallandtooshort
Fig. 1. Aggregate hours of work and employment in France and Italy, 1970–2005
Comment 313lived to enable a substantial impact on employment, even if one took
place nationwide.
If one looks at employment and hours trends in France generally,
there is clearly something unusual about them that needs explanation.
Figure 1 compares data for France and Italy since 1970. The trend in
their employment rates is about the same, but weekly hours of work
inthe working‐age population (notjustworkingpopulation)fellbymuch
moreinFrancethaninItaly.Inthecomparisonofhoursperemployee(not
shown), among the main European economies, France and Germany ex-
perienced similar large reductions that exceed reductions elsewhere, but
Frenchemploymentfellbymorethanintheothercountries.Itseemsthat
France has succeeded in reducing weekly hours, although notnecessarily
bylegislation,sincethedipafter2000infigure1issmallcomparedwiththe
overall trend before then. But it failed to attract more women into the la-
bor force or reduce unemployment by as much as the other European
countries of similar size have done. The overall trends in hours of work
and in employment do not justify optimism that a reduction in weekly
hours over and above the reduction in other countries will be accompa-
nied by a larger increase in employment than in those other countries.
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